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Transitional Phase of Gas Regulation
Frank P. Darrt
This Article addresses the transitional period of natural gas deregulation
underthe Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's recently promulgated Order
No. 636. Regulation of the natural gas industry is complicated because
although production is competitive, transportaion and local delivery systems
remain monopolistic. Order No. 636 requires gas pipelines to act as common
carriers and therefore shifts the locus of regulation to local distribution
companies (LDCs). This change means that small customers unable to switch
gas suppliers will likely face higher gas costs. Changes in the manner of
calculating rates and fuel-switching capabilities by larger purchasers
encourages this shift in cost. Additionally, deregulation of gas provision will
increase the exposure ofLDCs to fluctuations in gas price and availability. This
Article proposes that state regulators adopt a system of advanced planning and
incentive rate setting. Primarily this involves setting target gas cost ranges for
LDCs based on a mix of spot and longer-term contract prices for natural gas
and a sharing of gains and losses by the utility and its customers. Using
planning, utilities and regulatory commissions can reduce the amount of
regulatory risk inherent in the changing environment. By explicitly allowing
some risk sharing, state commissions can encourage utilities to take advantage
of competitive opportunities in gas commodity markets to the benefit of both
large and small gas customers.
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"In your supply contracts, no matter what way you go-if you tie
your supplies to indexes, to futures or to fixed prices-something will
go wrong. It's just the nature of things. ,t
Introduction
During the 1970s and 1980s, the natural gas market surged from shortage
to oversupply as prices fluctuated unpredictably.' Industry laid much of the
blame for these swings in price and availability upon regulation.' Consumers
claimed that attempts to control gas pricing4 saddled them with both gluts and
shortages. Likewise, regulation of pipeline and distribution companies met with
1. Donald Dodson, Impact of SFV Rates, 7hnmition Costs Overstated, Analysts Argue, INSIDE
RE.R.C., Nov. 29, 1993, at 11 (quoting John Bilardello speaking before Standard & Poor's annual
banking conference).
2. CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTnITIS 630-33 (2d ed. 1988); L.
K . Harrington, Law and Operations Under Order 436: Soling the Problems, 1 NAT. GAS L.J. 98, 99
(1986).
3. See generally PHILLIPS, supra note 2, at 628-53. Richard Vietor suggests that regulation and
market structure were closely intertwined. RICHARD H.K. VIEoR, CONTRIVED COMPETITION:
REGULATION AND DEREGULATION IN AMERICA 91-166 (1994). He writes that "the real substance of
business-government relations was the indirect impact of regulatory policy on the firm through its effects
on market structure and political interest groups." Id. at 92.
4. Over the protests of the Rederal Power Commission (FPC), the Supreme Court, in 1954, declared





substantial criticism. In response to such criticisms, federal regulators,
sometimes with the approval of Congress, began a process of deregulating the
natural gas business.5 The most recent step toward deregulation is the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission's Order No. 636.6
Order No. 636 eliminates the responsibility of interstate pipelines for
moving their own gas from the field to the city gate. The Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) has ordered the pipelines to unbundle and
reprice their services so that their customers-mainly local gas distribution
companies, municipal authorities, and industrial customers-can package their
gas service to include the best-priced combination of gas commodity and
transportation. 7 The deregulation methods employed in Order No. 636 are
consistent with the basic economic models used in recent years to deregulate
other traditional utility services.'
Far from removing the regulatory framework from gas sales, Order No.
636 shifts the regulatory focus to the last link in the distribution chain: the state
regulated distribution company. Several factors make this shift inevitable.
First, mandated change in market structure results in a dramatic shift of costs
from customers with choices to those without.9 Second, the local distribution
5. Congress began the process by decontrolling the wellhead price of natural gas as part of the major
energy law reforms enacted in 1978. Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1988)). Congress directed full price decontrol in the
Natural Gas Decontrol Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-60, 103 Stat. 157 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-
3432 (1988 & Supp. 1993)). The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has used its prior legislative
authority to begin decontrolling the use of gas transportation. See Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines
After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,334 (1987) (Order No. 500), remanded, American
Gas Ass'n v. FERC, 888 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial
Wellhead Decontrol, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,408 (1985) (Order No. 436), vacated and remanded, Associated
Gas Distrib. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1006 (1988).
6. Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to Regulations Governing Self-Implementing
Transportation, 57 Fed. Reg. 13,267 (1992) [hereinafter Order No. 636], reh'g graned in part and
denied in par, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,128 (1992) [hereinafter Order No. 636-A], reh'g denied, 57 Fed. Reg.
57,911 (1992) [hereinafter Order No. 636-B], appeal pending, Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. FERC, No.
92-8782 (1 1th Cir. filed Aug. 13, 1992). On February 15, 1994, the cases were transferred to the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Order 636 Challenges 7hznsferred to D. C. Ciruit Appeals
Court, ENERGY DAILY, Feb. 24, 1994. The chance of reversal appeared to diminish when the District
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals approved individual utility proposals to unbundle the utility's
transportation and sales. Elizabethtown Gas Co. v. FERC, 10 3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
7. These changes are codified at 18 C.ER. §§ 284.1-284.402 (1994).
8. For similar approaches to telecommunications based on assumptions that industry segments are
competitive, see PETER W. HUBER ET AL., THE GEODESIC NETWORK U: 1993 REPORT ON COMPETION
IN THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY (1993) (local telephone service); PETER W. HUBER, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, THE GEODESIC NETWORK: 1987 REPORT ON COMPETITION IN THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY
(1987) (interLATA telephone service and manufacturing). See generally Mark S. Fowler et al., 'Back
to the Riture': A Model for Telecommunications, 38 FED. CoMM. L.J. 145 (1986). Significant changes
are also underway in the regulation of electricity. The Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486,
106 Stat. 2776 (1992), initiated changes in the basic structure of electric generation and transportation,
and California announced a proposal in April 1994 for direct competition in the sale of electric power.
Andy Pasztor & Dave Kansas, Regulators Propose Direct Competition for Providing Electricity in
California, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 1994, at All.
9. See infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
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companies (LDCs) face increased risk in determining gas supplies and securing
regulatory approval for those choices. This increased risk will be reflected in
higher costs of securing capital, a major component of gas utility rates. t In
addition to higher costs, LDCs are now more likely to lose industrial customers
to competing gas sellers. " Finally, the company is likely to have more
difficulty providing its basic service: as an LDC increasingly relies on
contracting with multiple suppliers in lieu of a single pipeline with a tariffed
-duty to serve, the LDC runs the risk of incurring the wrath of its state
regulator if and when gas providers fail. 2
In response to these concerns, state regulatory commissions are likely to
increase their scrutiny of LDC gas purchasing practices. The tools available
to the commissions-prudence reviews, integrated resource planning, and
incentive rate setting-are problematic. In particular, some tools provide
incentives that are contrary to the goal of benefiting customers with low-cost
and reliable service. 3 The alternative, deregulation, is not the answer because
portions of the LDC market are not competitive. 4 Given this commercial
reality, commissions will have to take some role in regulating the
noncompetitive segment of the gas market.
Until it is clear what type of industrial structure will emerge in the
'distribution of natural gas and whether traditional forms of regulation remain
necessary, some form of transitional regulation will be required. Based on the
,current trends in regulation and policy, it appears likely that a policy will
emerge that attempts to provide incentives for LDCs to enter the marketplace
aggressively while partially protecting core customers. One approach may
employ advanced planning and incentive rate setting. Planning tends to assure
both the utility and the commission that reasonable efforts are being made to
take advantage of emerging gas opportunities. Incentives provide the utility
with the encouragement it may need to undertake the newly-created risks. In
addition, the commissions may have to take a critical look at the way that they
price interruptible service and transportation rates. The effects of such bypass
(such as the direct purchase of gas or the use of alternative fuels), however,
10. Credit Risks for Regulated Industries Rise Due to Deregulation, Moody's Says, DAILY REP. FOR
ExEcUTrrtss, Feb. 9, 1994, at A24; Increased Risk Wll Cloud Distributors' Credit Ratings, Says
Moody's, INSIDE F.E.R.C., Aug. 30, 1993, at 1 [hereinafter Increased Risk]; Moody's Report Concludes
Order No. 636 Mll Sluft Credit Risks from Pipelines to LDCs, FOSTER NAT. GAS REP., Aug. 26, 1993,
at 7 [hereinafter Moody's Report].
11. See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
12. This jeremiad should not suggest that the changes are all negative. For some customers, new
cost saving measures are likely to emerge. Likewise, whole new forms of risk management may appear.
Carol Freedenthal, The Gas Industry's Newest Commodity, FORT., Apr. 1, 1994, at 30. For others,
however, the transition will be costly, and regulators will have to justify their actions to various political
audiences.
13. See discussion infra Part II.C.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 25-26.
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may not be as significant a problem as the industry's jeremiads seem to
suggest.
This Article explores a potential transitional regulatory scheme based on
the conclusions set out above. The first part briefly explains the structure of
the natural gas industry and its regulation, and notes the changes and new risks
created by Order No. 636 for LDCs and their core customers. Part II reviews
the traditional form of cost regulation used by state commissions to price utility
service and the options state commissions have to address utility management
decisions. This part concludes that the common forms of regulation, by
themselves, do not offer the kinds of protection utility commissions are likely
to find acceptable. Finally, Part III identifies some common assumptions about
the emerging marketplace and proposes a combination of gas purchase planning
and incentive rate making to assure reliable, low-cost service.
I. Structural and Regulatory Background of Order No. 636
The changes directed by Order No. 636 are rooted in both the structure
and the regulation of the gas industry. Transportation and significant portions
of the sales market in the natural gas industry exhibit classic elements of
natural monopoly or oligopoly. This structure leads to the adoption of public
utility regulation. Production of natural gas is, however, potentially
competitive. Attempts to regulate production as if it were a monopoly result
in economic distortions. The industry's dual nature, monopolistic and
competitive, inspired a rethinking of gas regulation and ultimately Order No.
636.
A. The Industrial Structure of Gas Sales
Both the physical and financial size of the gas industry are impressive.
A 1992 report estimated distribution and transmission facilities at 1.25 million
miles. 5 Total deliveries (sales and transportation) exceeded 15 quadrillion
Btu. 6 In 1991, gas represented approximately one-quarter of total energy
usage in the United States.' 7 The plants dedicated to serve that usage were
valued at $129 billion. 8
There are two other important factors relating to gas usage. First, despite
subsidies historically built into rate structures, the cost of gas delivered to
15. AMERICAN GAs ASS'N, GAS ACTS: 1992 DATA 61 (1993).
16. Id. at 67. Sales constituted nearly 10 quadrillion Btu, with transportation providing the balance.
Residential deliveries amounted to 4.7 quadrillion Btu, commercial to 2.2 quadrillion Btu, and industrial
to 2.8 quadrillion Btu. Id.
17. Id. at 124.
18. Id. at 153.
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residential customers is nominally high relative to the cost to other classes of
customers.19 This translates into a substantial residential revenue base equal
to more than half of the utilities' gross income.2" Second, even with the
substantial and essentially constant industrial use, total gas sales are highly
seasonal, with sales increasing dramatically during the winter months.2
The business of moving gas from well to user is a multistep process of
gathering, transmission, and distribution.22 The first step entails drilling a
productive well and moving the gas to a transmission pipeline through
collecting or gathering pipelines. With thousands of producers, this stage of
the process is relatively competitive.' The cost of gas can, however, vary
greatly across regions.'
The process of moving gas to the end user is less competitive.' Since
World War II, transmission of gas has been accomplished through large, high-
pressure pipelines that extend for hundreds of miles from gathering areas
located primarily in the Southwest to other parts of the country. These capital-
intensive businesses tend to serve distinct areas with little head-to-head
competition with other gas companies (although there is indirect competition
from other sources of energy, such as electricity and oil). The pipeline served
as a bottleneck to the sale of gas. Likewise, when the gas neared the end user,
a monopoly provider, a LDC, controlled distribution. Authorized by state law,
these monopolies laid the last set of lines and pressure facilities that moved
19. In 1992, the average residential rate for approximately 1,000 cubic feet of gas was $5.69.
Commercial customers paid $4.92, and industrial customers paid $2.56. Id. at 107. Note that 1,000
cubic feet -1 MMBtu.
20. In 1992, residential revenues amounted to $26.7 billion, commercial to $10.9 billion, and
industrial to $7.9 billion. Id. at 87.
21. Id. at 72-73.
22. For a simple diagram of the gathering, transmission, and distribution process for natural gas,
see VIETOR, supra note 3, at 102.
23. See PHILLIs, supra note 2, at 633, 644-45. Hatcher and Missing state:
The phased decontrol of wellhead natural gas prices under the [Natural Gas Policy Act] had
a profound effect on the industry's structure. The buying and selling of natural gas as a
commodity, distinct from its transportation, became a textbook illustration of near-perfect
competition-thousands of buyers and sellers trading a homogenous commodity at prices
and according to contract terms that suited their separate needs. This reliance on forces of
supply and demand to establish prices, in lieu of government formulas or fiat, was the first
of three preconditions for the emergence of a competitive gas procurement sector.
David B. Hatcher & Arlon R. Missing, Occasional Paper No. 15, State Regulatory Challenges for the
Natural Gas Industry in the 1990s and Beyond 7 (June 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
Journal).
24. See AMERICAN GAS Ass'W , supra note 15, at 108 (noting 1991 lbxas welihead price of
$1.59/Mf and Michigan price of $2.79IMcf).
25. Concentration was noted as a problem relatively early in the industrial history of natural gas:
By 1932 the natural gas industry was concentrated horizontally and vertically. The same
four holding companies were the largest four companies in each sector of the
business-production, transmission, and distribution. Only the ranking varied . . . . The
four-firm concentration in gas production was only 16 percent, but in interstate transmission
it was 56 percent, and in distribution, about 60 percent.
VIETOR, supra note 3, at 98.
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the gas to the burnertip. To each community's customers, the transmission of
gas, and the purchase of the gas itself, was and remains a monopoly
enterprise.
26
Based on the three-tiered transportation structure and the existing scheme
of regulation, fixed long-term contracts became a standard feature of gas sales
and transportation.27 Both pipelines and LDCs obtained gas through long-term
(twenty-year) contracts. Under these contracts, the LDCs agreed to pay for
minimum amounts of gas (whether it was transported or not), while the
pipelines guaranteed peak amounts (contract requirements). 2' This process
remained relatively stable until the 1970's when price escalation broke the
symmetry of the relationship.29
B. The Changing Regulatory Structure
Against this mixture of competition and market power, the regulatory
scheme developed under a traditional natural monopoly model. The Natural
Gas Act?' assigned the Federal Power Commission (now FERC) the
responsibility of setting prices for transmission and certain resales of gas.
Eventually, jurisdiction was extended to wellhead prices. In time, fundamental
problems with gas supplies emerged contemporaneously with significant
regulatory problems. In reaction, Congress and the Commission began a
process of deregulating the price of gas and separating the gas-merchant
function from the gas-transmission function. These steps lead to Order No.
636.
The initial federal regulation, the Natural Gas Act, approached gas
regulation as a traditional utility monopoly problem. 3 In the traditional model
of welfare economics, regulation is justified to correct market failures that lead
26. Harry G. Broadman & Joseph P. Kalt, How Natural Is Monopoly? The Case of Bypass in
Natural Gas Distribution Markets, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 181, 197-98 (1989) (describing natural monopoly-
like characteristics of gas distribution); Suedeen G. Kelly, Intrastate Natural Gas Regulation: Finding
Order in the Chaos, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 355, 369 (1992) (noting most customers continue to receive
bundled service from LDC).
27. See generally Paul W. McAvoy et al., Is Competitive Entry Free? Bypass and the Partial
Deregulation in Natural Gas Markets, 6 YALE J. ON REO. 209, 216 (1989).
28. Daniel J. Duann, The FERCRestructuring Rule: Implications for Local Distribution Companies
and State Public Utility Commissions, 93-12 NAT'L RG. REs. INST. 31-32 (1993).
29. Id. at 32-33.
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1988).
31. In the late 1920s, the Federal Trade Commission conducted a study that became the basis for
regulation of the gas market. See Vanessa A. Richelle, Reworking Relationships in the Natural Gas
Industry: Exploring the New Spot-market and its Operation, 68 TUL. L. Rv. 655,657 (1994). The study
identified carriage as the problem and suggested the need for common carriage of natural gas. Congress,
however, rejected the common carriage approach and instead adopted a price regulation model similar
to that used in the Federal Power Act. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconstituting the Natural Gas Industry
from Wllhead to Burnertip, 9 ENERGY L.J. 1, 6 (1988).
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to inefficiency.2 Direct price regulation is often used against monopolies that
develop due to scale production factors or specific government decree. In the
case of a natural monopoly, the government may intervene to prevent the
monopolist from using its market power to raise prices above competitive
levels.33 Such regulation dictates average cost prices to the natural monopolist
as a substitute for the market's marginal pricing mechanisms.14
The rate-making formula used by commissions to determine the overall
revenue to which a utility is entitled is deceptively innocent looking:
Revenue = Operating Expenses + (Rate of Return) (Rate base).35
Generally, expenses are the variable costs associated with providing service.
These costs include wages, fuel costs, taxes, and depreciation of equipment.36
Rate base is the capital equipment necessary to provide the required service.37
Rate of return is the weighted average of the cost of debt and equity necessary
to finance utility operations.3"
Not all equipment owned by the utility can be included in the rate base.
First, only equipment used for activities that are related to utility operations
is included.39 Second, commissions will reduce the rate base for the
depreciation of equipment.' For those items properly included in the rate
base there is an additional hurdle: the company must demonstrate that the costs
of a capital item were prudently incurred.41 At issue is the reasonableness of
the costs of the investment in the new plant.42 To the extent that the costs are
32. Peter H. Aranson, Theories of Economic Regulation: Ftm Clarity to Confusion, 6 I.L. & POL.
247, 249-50 (1990). In addition to the natural monopoly rationale, an industry may be regulated so that
its prices reflect the full costs of its production. For example, the regulation of polluting industries is
designed to internalize the external costs imposed by pollution. Id. at 250-52. Regulation may also be
used to reverse the effect of informational filures. For example, "[a] role for government may arise
if workers remain ignorant of [a] risk to their health .... [Glovernment may exploit its coercive
sanction and economies of scale in the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information to overcome
this problem." Id. at 254. This traditional explanation for regulation, however, has suffered significant
attacks from all corners of the academic world. VIETOR, supra note 3, at 311-16. See also ROBERT B.
HORwITZ, THE IRONY OF REGULATORY REFORM 22-45 (1989). Nonetheless, information failure serves
as a starting point for explaining the basic model of regulation.
33. Aranson, supra note 32, at 255-58; Pierce, supra note 31, at 2-3.
34. Under marginal pricing, a utility would not recover the costs of providing the service because
its marginal cost would always be below its average cost in the relevant market area. JAMES C.
BONBRIGiT ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 434 (2d ed. 1988).
35. ERNEST GELLHORN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, REGULATED INDUSTRIES 89 (2d ed. 1987); RICHARD
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 347 (4th ed. 1992).
36. PHILLIPS, supra note 2, at 244.
37. GELLHORN & PIERCE, supra note 35, at 107.
38. See generally BoNtBalOrr ET AL., supra note 34, at 302-39.
39. GELLHORN & PIERCE, supra note 35, at 107-08.
40. Id. at 131-34; JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 192-223 (1961).
41. GELLHORN & PIERCE, supra note 35, at 109-11.
42. The reasonableness calculus applied to the cost of a capital item can be understood as follows:
Partial exclusion of an asset on grounds of prudence usually occurs in one of three
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deemed unreasonable, the investment cannot be included in the rate base of
the company and the investors are precluded from earning a return on it.43
Operating expenses are likewise subject to a two-step analysis. First, the
expense must be related to the provision of service to customers. Commissions
have disallowed a variety of expenses such as excess wages, advertising
expenses, and charitable contributions on the belief that these do not contribute
to the provision of service to customers." Second, even if the expense is
related to the production of service, the utility may only charge a reasonable
cost for it.4' In summary, "regulatory agencies retain the authority to exclude
costs from allowable revenues where the costs are not reasonably necessary
for providing the service ... and to reduce the amounts requested if they are
unreasonable and excessive."'
Initially, the Federal Power Commission regulated only transmission
facilities of interstate pipelines.47  In 1954, over the Commssion's
objection,4" the Supreme Court extended the jurisdiction of the Commission
to include the setting of the wellhead price of gas.49 Thus, the Commission
began a difficult period of attempting to regulate the gas sales of thousands of
gas drillers. Initially, the Commission attempted to price each sale on an
individual cost-of-service basis. When this process bogged down due to the
sheer volume of the undertaking, the Commission substituted regional and later
national pricing rules in an attempt to clear the regulatory gridlock.5" Prices,
however, lagged behind costs, and shortages developed. 5' In the 1970s,
perceived shortages and general economic malaise led Congress to reevaluate
situations-when the firm imprudently experiences cost overruns in constructing an asset,
when the firm pays too much to purchase an asset, or when the firm imprudently invests
in an asset with a capacity greater than necessary to provide the regulated product in
sufficient quantity.
Id. at 110.
43. As noted in the basic formula, exclusion from the rate base results in no recovery of a return
on that asset. Likewise, a commission will not permit amortization (depreciation expense) of the
imprudently incurred costs. In rm Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Facility, 70 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR)
475 (Kan. State Corp. Comm'n 1985), affid, Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 720 P.2d
1063 (Kan. 1986), vacated in par, 481 U.S. 1044, and appeal dismissed, Kansas City Power & Light
Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 483 U.S. 1036 (1987). Thus, the total amount deemed imprudent is lost
if no further adjustment is made in the rate of return to reflect the increased risk. Commissions are mixed
in their treatment of this matter. Compare id. %ith Office of Consumers' Counsel v. Utility Comm'n
of Ohio, 437 N.E.2d 586 (Ohio 1982).
44. JOSEPH P. TOMAIN ET AL., ENERGY LAW AND PoLIcY 166 (1989).
45. Id.; see PHILLIPS, supra note 2, at 246.
46. LoUIs B. SCHWARTZ ET AL., FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION: GOVERNMENT
REGULATION 525 (6th ed. 1985).
47. VIETER, supm note 3, at 102-03.
48. Pierce, supra note 31, at 7-8.
49. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954). Legislative gridlock furthered the
move to regulate the wellhead price of gas. VIETOR, supra note 3, at 105-07.
50. For a discussion of the attempts to adopt pricing structures for gas, see Permian Basin Area
Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1969). See also Pierce, supra note 31, at 8-9.
51. Pierce, supra note 31, at 10; Richelle, supra note 31, at 658-59.
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the rules for pricing gas. As part of the 1978 energy legislation, Congress
adopted the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA),52 which over a series of years
increased the allowable price for some gas and removed price controls on other
gas, depending on the source and time of its discovery.
Partial decontrol of natural gas prices and the recession in the early 1980s
turned shortages of gas into surpluses.53 Pipelines that had contracted for gas
under the higher NGPA schedules found that the gas was not marketable and
began to lose sales from customers with the ability to switch to other fuels.5"
Unable to sell contracted-for gas, pipelines sought ways to reopen markets and
increase the use of transportation (carriage of gas owned by a third party or
a customer rather than the pipeline). Initially, the Commission approved
Special Marketing Plans that permitted pipelines to sell gas to fuel switchers
at reduced rates.5" This program began to solve pipelines' problems of gas-
surplus purchases, but it failed judicial review.56 In response, the Commission
adopted Order No. 436 (and subsequently Order No. 500 in response to
judicial remands of the Commission's rulemaking in Order No. 436)"7 to
provide mechanisms that allowed the conversion of contract-demand service
to transportation.5" In effect, the Commission directed the beginning of
unbundling, as customers could now contract separately for gas and
transportation.
Despite the significant conversion of supply purchasing to transportation
during the initial years of the approach under Order No. 436,"9 the
Commission concluded that the open transportation dictated by Order No. 436
failed to create an efficient marketplace in gas.' The Commission concluded
that the pipelines' ability to control access to transportation and its quality
resulted in an inefficient reliance on traditional bundled services (even while
52. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1988).
53. Duann, supra note 27, at 33.
54. Pierce, supra note 31, at 11. For example, an industrial gas customer might switch from gas
to fuel oil.
55. PHILLIPS, supra note 2, at 472 n.91 (collecting cases).
56. Maryland Peoples Counsel v. FERC, 761 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (finding Special Marketing
Programs unduly discriminatory).
57. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
58. Broadman and ialt have noted that the Orders and the then existing environment provided mixed
incentives for bypass. On the one hand, the existing fixed contracts and rate structures encouraged
bypass. On the other hand, reductions in contract demands and conversions to transportation reduced
the need to leave the local distribution system. Broadman & Kalt, supra note 26, at 184-87.
59. Richelle, supra note 31, at 656 n.4 (noting spot-market purchases were approximately forty
percent of interstate sales in 1986 and increased to seventy percent in 1988).
60. For the purists advocating deregulation, Order No. 436 fell short in several regards. It did not
require pipelines to unbundle their services. More importantly for the courts and pipelines, Order No.
436 failed to address an important asymmetry: Pipelines remained liable to suppliers even while LDCs
were being given the opportunity to forgo the purchase of existing contract requirements. For a succinct
discussion of the minimum bill and take-or-pay problems caused by commission efforts to address the
1980s downturn in sales, see ViaTOt, supra note 3, at 132-61.
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more and more gas was in fact being transported for end users).6" The
Commission also found evidence that pipelines were discriminating in the
quality of service they provided to end users that had migrated to
transportation. 2 These findings led to the promulgation of Order No. 636.
C. The Basics of Order No. 636
To rectify the inefficiency created by pipelines' control of service quality,
the Commission ordered that pipelines unbundle sales and transportation of
gas.63 Although an LDC could purchase both gas and transportation from a
pipeline, gas would be sold separately from the transportation service necessary
to move the gas to the end user. Moreover, the commodity price of gas would
no longer be set by the Commission. The effect of these changes was to place
the responsibility of ensuring gas for the end user on the LDC.
1. Unbundled Sales and Transportation
To avoid discrimination between sales and transportation, Order No. 636
requires pipelines to separate gas sales from transportation." The Order also
explicitly sets out a requirement that there should be no undue discrimination
in the terms of sales and gas contracts.65 In an attempt to permit greater
flexibility and access to markets, the Order further provided for flexible
delivery and receipt points, in other words, gas could be injected into the
pipeline and taken from it at varying points according to need.6 To enhance
the available information concerning rates and available capacity, the rule
requires pipelines to establish electronic bulletin boards containing rate and
other contract information. 67
61. In its order, the Commission noted that transportation amounted to seventy-nine percent of total
gas throughput on the interstate pipelines, but that LDCs had not exercised a similar amount of contract-
demand reductions. As a result, LDCs were paying for fixed levels of service but receiving gas subject
to conditions of interruptible service. Order No. 636, supra note 6, at 13,272-73. The Commission
further noted that transportation was also limited by pipeline restrictions, lack of storage, and lack of
access to upstream capacity. Id. at 13,275.
62. Id. at 13,275. The Commission buttressed its decision by finding that pipelines were injured
by bundled service requirements and the use of weighted average costing for gas sold under regulation.
Under such a pricing scheme, the pipelines could not compete for gas sales to parties who could contract
separately for gas purchases. Buyers could purchase gas at lower marginal prices than those available
through the pipeline and then contract for the particular level of service they wanted. As a result, buyers
could avoid the averaged cost of gas and unwanted premiums associated with service reliability offered
by the pipeline.
63. Id. at 13,277.
64. See 18 C.ER. §§ 284.8(a)(1), 284.9(a)(1) (1994).
65. Id. §§ 284.8(b)(2), 284.9(b)(2). See also Order No. 636, supra note 6, at 13,282.
66. 18 C.F.R. § 284.221(g)-(h) (1994).
67. Id. §§ 284.8(b)(3)-284.8(b)(5), 284.9(b)(3)-284.9(b)(5).
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A revised view of the market underlies the separation between sales and
transportation. In its Orders, the Commission concluded that gas production
was sufficiently competitive to permit markets to set pricing for the
commodity. 6 Transportation, on the other hand, retained its monopoly
status. 69
2. Encouraging Alternative Gas Sourcing
To encourage the pipelines' existing firm customers to switch gas sources,
the Commission also revised existing contract and tariff obligations. Initially,
the Commission directed the conversion of firm rights to gas supplies (contract
demand or CD rights) to a right to firm-no-notice transportation.7 Under this
rule, gas purchasers under existing firm-purchase contracts were entitled to
the same daily firm amounts of transportation, but the buyers were now
responsible for separately assuring that gas needed by their systems was
available for transportation. The Commission also ordered that downstream
pipelines transfer their capacity rights to upstream pipelines to end users.7'
To the extent that such transportation was not necessary, buyers were permitted
to release capacity through pregranted abandonment.72 Finally, the
Commission defined transportation to include storage facilities.73 The effect
of this decision was to make storage a tariffed item available to end users on
a nondiscriminatory basis.74
3. Pricing Firm Transportation Service
Consistent with other changes that attempted to increase the economic
efficiency of pipeline service, the Commission also addressed transportation
pricing. Before Order No. 636, the Commission usually assigned some portion
of fixed costs to the incremental commodity charge for gas in order to
encourage pipelines to seek customers for abundant supplies .7 Because a
fixed cost was added to a variable cost item utilities could only fully recover
their fixed costs by using all of their capacity. The Commission found this
68. Order No. 636-A, supra note 6, at 36,179.
69. Order No. 636, supra note 6, at 13,269.
70. See 18 C.F.R. § 284.8(a)(4) (1994). See also Order No. 636, supra note 6, at 13,287.
71. 18 C.FR. § 284.242 (1994). See also Order No. 636, supra note 6, at 13,283.
72. 18 C.F.R. § 284.243 (1994). Typically abandonment (the termination of previously authorized
service) requires Commission review of a specific request and a finding that abandonment is in the public
interest. 15 U.S.C. § 717b (1988); 18 C.F.R. §§ 157.5-157.21 (1994).
73. 18 C.FR. § 284.1 (1994).
74. In theory, and probably now in practice, end users could contract for storage so as to purchase
gas when prices are low. Then they could hold the gas until it is needed and low-cost supplies are not
available. The ability to store, however, is dependent on both storage rights and capacity rights.
75. Order No. 636, supra note 6, at 13,292.
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pricing scheme inconsistent with the market-based pricing of gas and
announced that it would no longer seek to shift fixed costs into the variable
cost of gas. Instead, the Commission adopted a straight fixed-variable method
for setting transportation rates in which all fixed costs would be assigned to
the demand portion of the rate.76 One obvious effect of this change was to
shift costs from high-load/low-peak customers (industrial customers) to low-
lbad/high-peak customers (LDCs serving residential customers).' Another
effect was to put more pressure on firm contract holders to reduce the amount
of demand charges by reducing firm no-notice transportation claims.
D. The Apparent Effects of Order No. 636 on Local Regulation of Natural
Gas
Taken together, the rule changes in Order No. 636 placed a new set of
burdens on local distribution companies. As the Commission offered: "It is
true that the Commission has changed the terms and conditions of service and
thereby subjected pipeline customers to more responsibilities, duties, and
risks."" That assertion probably understates the result. The LDC, in
particular, is now at risk for securing supplies to assure availability, avoiding
curtailment of its transportation, and doing all of this at a reasonable cost. The
LDC has become a portfolio manager of gas sources, a role unheard of until
recently.79
This shift of risk to LDCs comes at the same time as another important
regulatory policy. No longer will the doctrine of federal supremacy dictate the
pricing of wholesale gas. 0 Instead, responsibility for reviewing the LDC's
gas costs will shift to the states. As George Hall noted in a similar context:
"[Public utility commissions] must confront such issues as whether LDCs are
assuming an inappropriate amount of risk or are being sufficiently aggressive
76. 18 C.F.R. § 284.8(d) (1994); Order No. 636, supra note 6, at 13,270; Order No. 636-A, supra
note 6, at 36,173.
77. Order No. 636, supra note 6, at 13,270; Order No. 636-A, supra note 6, at 36,173. LDCs with
a high proportion of residential sales face significant problems due to the purchasing patterns of their
customers. The cost shift occurs because residential customers tend to buy at defined periods (particularly
winter months) when the price of gas is highest and available capacity on a pipeline is at a premium.
These peaks must be satisfied by the creation of capacity, a fixed cost. Since fixed costs are no longer
shared with interruptible customers, inevitably, capacity costs shift back to remaining firm customers.
78. Order No. 636-B, supra note 6, at 57,912.
79. Order No. 636-A, supra note 6, at 36,166-67.
80. Extensive literature exists on federal preemption of state rate-making authority. For a listing
of these articles and a discussion of the Supreme Court decisions, see Frank P. Darr, Mitigating Costs
and the Preemptive Effect of Federal Rate Orders, 13 ENERY L.J. 61 (1992). For purposes of this
Article, it is assumed that the states will have the authority to review LDC purchasing practices. For
the time being, that position is also the one adopted by the FERC. See, e.g., Order No. 636-A, supra
note 6, at 36,205.
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in seeking bargains."' The balancing act will take place within the context
of state reviews to determine the appropriate amount of gas costs that should
be borne by utility customers.
Several factors make this shift of risk inevitable.82 First, FERC's change
to the straight fixed-variable method of rate setting results in a substantial shift
of costs from customers with choices to those without. That is, industrial
customers that have access to alternative providers of gas or those that can
switch to alternate fuels will face reduced costs while residential and small
commercial customers are likely to see higher ones.83 Second, LDCs face
increased risk in determining gas supplies and securing regulatory approval
for those choices that will be reflected in higher costs to secure capital, a
major component of a gas utility rate case." This increased risk is also likely
to be found in a company's ability to provide its basic service: as it relies to
a greater extent on contracting with multiple suppliers in place of a single
pipeline with a tariffed duty to serve, it incurs the risk that gas providers will
fail and that the LDC will incur the wrath of its state regulators for those
failures.8 5 Indeed, increased regulatory risk, the risk that the markets will
perceive a company as being underfunded due to state regulatory action,
appears to be one of the dominant concerns arising from Order No. 636.86
The combination of higher prices and less reliable service for politically
powerful customers will likely lead to a disaster for regulators.
At the same time that it becomes more difficult to serve core customers,
Order No. 636 creates additional pressures for bypass. "[B] ypass occurs when
customers of the LDC turn to another gas provider such as an interstate,
81. George R. Hall, Getting Regulation from 'Here' to 'There", in DRAwiNG THE LINE ON
NATURAL GAS REGULATION: THE HARVARD STUDY ON THE FUTURE OF NATURAL GAS 241, 260 (Joseph
P. Kalt & Frank C. Schuller eds., 1987).
82. For an excellent discussion of the likely impacts of Order No. 636, see William P. Boswell,
The New Competitive Monopoly: A Thundering Silence, FORT., Oct. 1, 1992, at 27.
83. Estimates vary as to the amount of redistribution of costs. GAO Issues FInal Report on Order
No. 636 Economic Impacts, FOSTER NAT. GAS REP., Nov. 11, 1993, at 1. The General Accounting
Office estimates that the transfer will amount to approximately $1.2 billion annually. RESOURCES,
COMMUNITY, & ECONOMIC DEV. DIV., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NATURAL GAS: COSTS,
BENEFITS, AND CONCERNS RELATED TO FERC's ORDER .636, at 2 (1993) [hereinafter GAD REPORT].
In addition, local distribution companies will face new costs associated with acquiring gas that were not
necessary under the prior regime. Id. at 4. See also Local Distribution Company Post-Restructuring Issues
Are Identified in GAO Report Appendices, FOSTER NAT. GAS REP., Nov. 18, 1993, at 20. Finally, there
will be significant one time charges associated with the conversion of existing gas contracts. According
to the GAD, new costs associated with transition required under the rule amount to about $300 million.
GAO REPORT, supm, at 10.
84. Increased Risk, supra note 10, at 1; Moody's Report, supra note 10, at 7.
85. Increased Risk, supra note 10, at 1; Kansas State Regulator and East Coast Distributor
Representative Explain to Energy Bar Conference Their Concerns About Economic Rationale and Cost
Impact of Order No. 636-1927, FOSTER NAT. GAS REP., May 13, 1993, at 5.
86. Craig S. Cano, LDCs Wsn Market-BasedRegulation, but States Need More Convincing, INSIDE
F.E.R.C., May 3, 1993, at 7; Phillip S. Cross, Major Issues Remain for States as Order 636 Arrives,
FORT., Nov. 1, 1993, at 58; Dodson, supra note 1, at 11.
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intrastate, or private pipeline; or start using a fuel other than gas.., or invest
in conservation measures to consume less gas. "17 The problem with bypass
is that someone must absorb the share of the gas system's fixed costs that the
bypassing customer is no longer paying. 8 Either the remaining customers will
absorb these costs, shareholders' returns will decrease, or the company will
have to reduce the costs of service, possibly by degrading existing levels of
service. 9 As the interstate gas system opened during the 1980s, bypass
became an increasing concern because gas producers were willing to sell gas
to end users who found pipelines to transport the gas to their facilities."o
Order No. 636 further encourages bypass by removing existing barriers to
transportation and increasing an LDC's cost of purchasing firm gas from a
pipeline (by the use of the straight fixed-variable rate methodology). The net
effect is to increase the likelihood that the customers with the least economic
power will face increased costs. Like the concerns about increased reliability,
the bypass problem points to increased state scrutiny.
II. State Action on Order No. 636
While it seems reasonable to assume that state commissions will continue
to increase their level of oversight, it is less clear what form this increased
oversight will take. Traditional regulation has taken the form of cost-plus
pricing and does not fit the emerging environment of partial competition. In
addition, both the traditional forms of review and more recent efforts at
resource planning and incentive pricing have their own significant problems.
A. The Traditional Structure of Rate Regulation
The existence of natural monopoly-like circumstances in gas distribution
implicates the classic rationale for regulation. For at least some core
customers, there are few or limited opportunities for alternative sources of
gas.9' Whether driven by the inherent economics of gas provision or the lack
of alternative physical facilities, these core customers are locked into a single
provider, the LDC. 2 The traditional model of regulation has thus been for
87. Kelly, supra note 26, at 360.
88. Id. For example, if the fixed costs of an LDC are $2 million a year and these are spread over
4 million units of gas, each unit of gas must carry a 50C charge per unit for fixed costs. If, for some
reason, a large customer leaves the system and the gas sold by the LDC goes to 3.5 million units, the
remaining customers will pay a 57C charge per unit for fixed costs.
89. Broadman & Kalt, supra note 26, at 203.
90. Kelly, supra note 26, at 360.
91. A distinction is commonly drawn between core and non-core customers. Non-core customers
have fuel-switching options.
92. Hatcher & Ibssing, supra note 23, at 13-14.
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a commission to set prices using a rate-of-return formula. State commissions
have responded in several ways to the changes required by Order No. 636.
B. Formal State Actions in Response to Order No. 636
One area of concern involves the transition costs that FERC permitted the
pipelines to pass to LDCs.93 Despite FERC's attempt, in its Order, to
preempt state review, commissions have sought to address the manner in which
costs will be transferred to LDC customers.94 Likewise, some commissions
are already attempting to address issues concerning the bypass of LDCs
through rate structure reviews.95 These types of claims could well be expected
in light of FERC's stated goals in the rule change.
Rate-of-return levels are also ripe for reconsideration. LDCs, for example,
are requesting increased rates of return as compensation for the increased risk
they face in making supply choices.96 In addition to the rather obvious request
for a higher return on equity, there is also the potential for altered debt-equity
structure. One Wisconsin utility sought to revise its approved structure so that
it could assume additional short-term debt to finance storage costs.9"
Much of the transitional work, however, remains to be done.98 For
example, states are struggling with the periodic filing requirements for gas
purchases to accommodate the new obligations placed on LDCs. 9 At least
two kinds of problems are likely to emerge. One is the technical treatment of
newly identified costs, such as storage, that result from unbundling
93. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
94. Statement of Policy Regarding the Recovery of FERC Order 636 Transition Costs, 1993 Pa.
PUC LEXIS 77 (Oct. 15, 1993); Investigation into the Appropriate Recovery by Illinois Gas Utils. of
FERC Order 636 Transition Costs, 1993 Ill. PUC LEXIS 387 (Sept. 15, 1993).
95. In re Application of Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. for Revision of its Gas & Elec. Rates, 1993
Md. PUC LEXIS 99 (Apr. 23, 1993); In re Petition of Northern States Power Cos. Gas Util. for Auth.
to Change its Schedule of Gas Rates for Retail Customers in Minnesota, 146 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR)
1 (Minn. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1993).
96. Washington Utils. & Transp. Comm'n v. Washington Natural Gas Co., 1993 Wash. UTC
LEXIS 87 (Sept. 27, 1993); Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 1993 Ill. PUC LEXIS 245, at *111 (July
21, 1993).
97. Application of Wisconsin Gas Co., a Gas Pub. Util., to Increase Natural Gas Rates, 1993 Wisc.
PUC LEXIS 68 (Nov. 11, 1993).
98. One survey concluded that most states appear to be taling a wait-and-see approach in
considering the appropriate regulatory action to Order No. 636. Survey of States Uncovers No Radical
Effort to Reform LDC Regulations this Wnter, but Ideas for Local Responses to FERC's Restructuring
of Natural Gas Pipelines Are Being Explored, FOSTER NAT. GAS REP., Feb. 10, 1994, at 12-20.
99. Many states allow gas utilities to file changes in the gas components of their rates on a periodic
basis. This fuel clause adjustment addresses the cost recovery for gas purchases. The process of adjusting
the gas cost recovery becomes more complex as the available alternatives expand. In re Regulation of
the Purchased Gas Adjustment Clause Contained in the Rate Schedules of Murphy Gas, Inc., 1993 Ohio
PUC LEXIS 888 (Sept. 30, 1993); In re National Fuel Gas Distribution Corp. for Waiver of Certain
Provisions of Regulations, 1993 Pa. PUC LEUS 96 (June 15, 1993).
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service.' 0° A second and more important issue is the rule structures and
incentives that commissions will adopt in light of the less heavily regulated
federal portion of gas sales.' 0 '
State commissions are only beginning to look at the long-term regulatory
questions. The Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities issued one early
decision on the treatment of changes in supply sources. In its decision, the
Department concluded that it could not make wholesale changes in its approach
to cost recovery, and it would not greatly change its level of review.'ce It
adopted a two-phase approach. In the first phase, LDCs would seek approval
of gas conversions. The conversions would need to be prudent and based on
a comparison of available, market-offered replacement resources. Prior
approval, however, would not assure the recovery of these gas costs. In the
second phase, the Department would continue to review the utility's
management of the resulting gas contracts. Because these contracts would
provide the LDCs with the ability to adjust their actual purchases, the
Department would continue to monitor those contracts approved in the first
phase.
In contrast, the California Commission has embarked on a more
aggressive use of incentive regulation of gas procurement. In one case, the
Commission announced its intent to tie gas prices to futures prices (with some
consideration given to other indices and some given to long-term stability). 03
To the extent there was any under- or over-recovery, the approach called for
an even distribution of the gains or losses between shareholders and rate
payers. "0
As the Massachusetts and California opinions suggest, the real battles
about the prudence of costs incurred by LDCs are beginning to take place. As
the next round of requests for rate increases and purchased-gas adjustment-
clause cases begin, the states will be forced to determine whether the LDCs
are acting prudently within the new environment.
C. Alternative Regulatory Responses to Order No. 636
State commissions have several tools, such as prudence reviews and
resource planning, with which to respond to the changes caused by Order No.
100. Indiana has taken tentative steps to deal with these costs. See, e.g., In re Kokomo Gas & Fuel
Co. for Approval of Gas Cost Adjustment, 1993 Ind. PUC IE3US 228 (June 17, 1993); In re Northern
Indiana Pub. Serv. Co. for Approval of Gas Cost Adjustment, Commodity Cost of Gas Adjustment, &
"hike-Or-Pay Surchage Adjustment, 1993 Ind. PUC LEXIS 173 (Apr. 30, 1993).
101. See, e.g., Gas Price Hedging, 151 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 58 (Iowa Util. Bd. Apr. 8,
1994).
102. In re Berkshire Gas Co., D.P.U. 93-187, 1994 WL 71304 (Mass. Dept. Pub. Util. Jan. 19,
1994).
103. Southern California Gas Co., 1994 Cal. PUC LEXIS 231 (Mar. 16, 1994).
104. Id. at *31-32.
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636. Although it appears likely that there will be increased pressure to
unbundle services at the local level,"°5 deregulation of all gas service does
not appear to be likely. Several factors point to the retention of some form of
continued regulation. First, core residential service retains its natural-monopoly
characteristics."° Second, there are some practical limits to fuel switching
by larger customers." ° Finally, there are some painful distributional effects
associated with the Order that state regulators are unlikely to ignore. ° As
a result, LDCs will probably see continued regulation,"° and some
commentators suggest that the LDCs are likely to see increased levels of
regulation in the short-term. 0
As noted previously, some state commissions are already studying the
problems that the Order has created.' Emerging out of these efforts, and
numerous articles and conferences, is a consensus that regulation will move
in one of several directions: toward modified prudence reviews, integrated
resource planning, or incentive regulation.' Each has its own strengths and
weaknesses when judged in light of the policy goals state regulators typically
use to explain their actions with regard to an industry in transition.
1. Regulatory Goals
Although many criteria are used to measure the appropriateness of a
regulatory approach," 3 three are predominant. First, the approach should
make it possible for utilities to attract capital without extracting monopoly
profits from customers. 4  Second, the regulation should have the
distributional goal of making the product available to all who need or want it.
In this regard, dividing the costs of services becomes important as commissions
attempt to subsidize particular classes of users who may not be able to afford
105. See supra text accompanying notes 87-89.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
107. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Intrastate Natural Gas Regulation: An Alternative Perspective, 9 YALE
J. ON REa. 407, 408-11 (1992).
108. The most obvious short-term effect is the recovery of several billion dollars in transition costs.
This recovery will be followed by years of potential transfers effected by the adoption of straight-fixed
variable rate making. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
109. Cano, supra note 86, at 7.
110. Phillip S. Cross, Major Issues Remain for States as Order 636 Arrives, FORT., Nov. 1, 1993,
at 58.
111. See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
112. Regulator: ResidentiaLt Vll Be on the Short End of Order 636 Benefits, INSIDE F.E.R.C., June
1, 1992, at 6 [hereinafter Regulator].
113. BoNBRiotrr Er AL., supra note 34, at 92.
114. Id. at 101. This notion of price setting is composed of elements related to capital attraction,
efficient production, and consumer rationing. Id. at 92-101. "All three of the functions of public utility
rates (based on these rationales) are designed cooperatively to serve one common goal of rate-making
policy: the provision of the community with adequate kinds and amounts of public utility service,
produced in an economical manner." Id. at 101.
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a service level or who have the political wherewithal to claim a preferred
allocation. 5 Like the telephone industry, where there were significant
consumer subsidies built into the system," 6 the changes in gas regulation
present real threats of unbundling and bypass at the local level that threaten
any subsidies in existence." 7 Finally, the costs of administering regulation
should be reasonable; that is, there should be real benefits to enforcing a
particular regulatory regime. It makes no sense to adopt a particular regime
if it will not produce benefits-lower prices or lower costs of capital
attraction-that outweigh the administrative costs. Thus, there is a practical
limit to the amount of tinkering that a commission can and should attempt.
'8
Without doubt, there is tension among these goals. To the extent a subsidy
exists in a currently approved pricing scheme, it cannot withstand the effects
of alternative providers. The subsidy will be bid out of the system." 9 On the
other hand, it is plainly unfair to allow fuel-switching customers to burden
captive customers with the full fixed costs of service. Those core customers'
contributions to fixed costs are a significant reason that fuel switching is
available. Finally, it is impossible to assign rates a true cost of service and thus
to manipulate the rates to their "efficient" levels. 2 ' There is no simple
administrative answer to the problem.
Although no simple formula will relieve the conflict of regulatory goals,
one solution might be to adopt only some of the goals.' Practically,
however, no commission can take such an approach because of competing
political concerns and the immediate short-term economic transfers that might
115. Id. at 101-05.
116. See Alfred E. Kahn & William B. Shew, Current Issues in Telecommunications Regulation:
Pricing, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 191, 194-95 (1987). Similar concerns arise over the transfers that will occur
with the change to straight fixed-variable rate making.
117. Regulator, supra note 112, at 6 ("[IThe past practice often has been to adopt cost-allocation
methods 'because they tend to favor the residential class. Such favoritism toward the residential class
may not be possible in the future.'"); see also Larry Foster, Debate on LDC Restructuring Long on
Questions, Short on Answers, INSIDE EE.R.C., May 24, 1993, at 10.
118. The practical limit may be seen by examining the risk of LDC gas procurement eror.
It is evident that the risk for the LDC in buying too much or too little commodity gas and
transportation capacity or paying too much for gas services always exists. No matter how
strict the state oversight is, the risk of making "errors" in gas procurement cannot be totally
eliminated. So the objective of state oversight is not to require the LDCs to develop a
"perfect" gas procurement strategy but to eliminate any systematic and preventable "errors"
or "distortions" that are attributable to the LDCs. In other words, the emphasis of the state
commission's involvement should be to communicate clearly with the LDCs regarding their
responsibility and flexibility in arranging gas supplies without the threat of later penalties
arising from regulatory hindsight.
Duann, supra note 28, at 74-75.
119. But see infra text accompanying notes 200-01.
120. The problem is intractable because of the existence of common cost for finn and interruptible
transportation and commodity service. There is no principled rule to allocate these costs to particular
customers. Pierce, supra note 107, at 414.
121. "lytpical of that approach is Mark Fowler's controversial position on telephone deregulation.
See Fowler et al., supm note 8.
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occur." Instead, there must be a balancing of the various interests. The
point of accommodation may vary,"z but it will always exist in some form
or another. Because there is no right answer, some process must accommodate
the various interests. The current popular ideas are prudence reviews,
integrated resource planning, and incentive rate making.
2. Prudence Reviews
Historically, commission practice has been to judge utility costs through
a retrospective prudence review. 24 In a prudence review, a commission
analyzes a utility's management decisions to determine their reasonableness
given the surrounding circumstances.' Many states use some form of
prudence review. 2
The strength of the prudence review is that it does not displace the
management's ability to make decisions. In its most effective form, the review
only examines whether the management decisions and related costs were
reasonable under the circumstances.127 The examination process itself has
an important attribute:
Reasonableness reviews reduce an important asymmetry of
information that exists between a utility and its regulator .... [Tihe
PUC has enough time to get all the facts it needs to review the
reasonableness of a gas utility's supply portfolio. Reasonableness
reviews, although generally unpopular, have been effective in
catching or preventing large errors made by LDC managers.1
2
As noted previously, it seems likely that utility commissions will continue to
use prudence reviews as a means of assuring the public that its welfare is being
safeguarded. 2 9
122. Order No 636 is remarkable in this regard given the large transfers involved in its
implementation. See supra note 83. FERC faced the same kinds of conflicts and modified its introduction
of straight fixed-variable rate making, offering small companies alternative rate schedules that broke
from the efficiency arguments driving the rest of the order. Order No. 636-A, supra note 6, at 36,173
(rates for small customers subject to volumetric one-part rates).
123. The Illinois Commerce Commission is approaching regulation with a lighter hand, trying to
keep "regulatory interference... to a minimum." Cano, supra note 86, at 7 (quoting Ruth Krutschmer,
Illinois Commerce Commissioner, speaking at the April 1993 Conference sponsored by the National
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners and the Department of Energy).
124. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
125. See Duann, supra note 28, at 76.
126. Id. at 75 (reporting 31 of 50 states have conducted such reviews).
127. See iqfr notes 130-133 and accompanying text.
128. CHARLES GOLDMAN ET AL., PRIMER ON GAS INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLANNING 71 (1993).
129. Id. at 71-72 ("[Rlegulators will be reluctant to remove after-the-fact reasonableness reviews
because their regulated utilities that have heretofore been protected and many [utilities] will not have
a proven record of operating in competitive gas markets.").
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There is a significant philosophical and doctrinal limitation on the
traditional prudence review. Inherent in the determination that a capital item
or an expense is too high is a rejection of the management decision to incur
that cost. "If ... consumers prove that utility management was imprudent...
then imprudent management expenses will be excluded from [the expenses]
component of the rate-making formula."130 Such a determination shifts the
cost to the utility's investors by moving it out of the revenue formula.'
Thus the reasonableness assessment implies a standard of review of
management decision making. The standard of review may vary, depending
on the type of expense involved. In the case of expenses for which there is
arm's length bargaining for the item or service, the commission normally gives
great deference to management's choices because the market tends to force the
price of the item to competitive levels. On the other hand, commissions will
impose a higher level of review in the absence of such bargaining, as in the
case of transactions with affiliated companies."32 Even in those situations,
however, the courts will require some deference to utility management. The
commission must establish that there has been an abuse of discretion and must
overcome a presumption of managerial good faith.' 33 The problem is to
determine the degree of deference that ought to be afforded to the utility's
management.
The dichotomy between arm's length and affiliate transactions, however,
does not appear to be particularly pertinent to the emerging state regulation
of gas after Order No. 636. If one were to accept the dichotomy, the changes
wrought by Order No. 636 would not appear to be significant. In an
environment that is likely to be increasingly competitive, the utility's decisions
would seem to be sacrosanct. Only in those instances in which an LDC was
purchasing gas from a parent or sister company would the state commission
apply a marginally higher level of scrutiny.
The application of the dichotomy is not quite so simple in the Order No.
636 environment. Additional factors must be considered in the prudence
review. The Order creates a brand-new world for LDCs. The LDC is not a
city-gate purchaser from a source whose prices have already been scrutinized.
Their managers are now responsible for creating a portfolio of gas. These
decisions bring new kinds of risks. Under these circumstances, it is not clear
whether lower levels of review are warranted (given the market checks) or
whether higher standards are more appropriate (given the greater levels of
risk).
130. ToMAIN ET AL., supra note 44, at 166.
131. Id.
132. PHILLIPS, supra note 2, at 245.
133. Id. at 246.
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Prudence reviews also come with significant costs. First, the process is
administratively expensive for both the LDC and the commission. "A prudence
review is typically an elaborate and involved process because the state
commissions and the LDCs need to reconstruct the market environment upon
which the procurement decisions were made initially. It can be a huge
undertaking even under the best of circumstances. " '34 Moreover, as Duann
notes, the complexity of the review process can only increase as the number
of potential procurement decisions increases with the deregulation of
commodity pricing and interstate transportation. 35
Second, the review process may encourage uneconomic choices in both
directions. On the one hand, the utility may be too aggressive and lock into
short-term contracts to lower prices and thereby increase the risk of a supply
disruption. 136 On the other hand, the LDC may fear supply disruption so
much that it locks in useless long-term contracts and thereby exposes customers
to unnecessarily high gas prices for long-term supplies. 37 In either case, the
risk of an unfavorable prudence audit would adversely affect the supply
mix. 138
Finally, there is no positive benefit from being aggressive in the traditional
prudence review. Because gas costs are an expense, there is a rough dollar for
dollar recovery, and the utility gains no particular advantage from an effective
cost strategy.
[A]II cost savings from a more efficient fuel portfolio are passed
through to ratepayers, if not immediately, then within a short period.
Without some positive benefit, utilities will tend to be more passive
and cautious in fuel procurement, emphasizing stable (read static) and
reliable fuel sources over less costly alternatives, whose substantial
price discount may more than offset any disadvantage from lower
reliability.1 39
134. Duann, supra note 27, at 76.
135. Id. at 76-77.
136. Stephen A. Furbacher, PUC Review of Supply Management, in RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS:
CONFERENCE ON NATURAL GAS USE, STATE REGULATION AND MARKET DYNAMICS IN THE POST
636/ENERY POuCY ACT ERA 119 (Apr. 26-28, 1993); Craig S. Cano, Unbundling at LDC Level Wl
Feature New Set of Problems, NARUC bld, INSIDE EE.R.C., Aug. 3, 1992, at 13.
137. Increased Risk, supra note 10, at 1 (recognizing both sides of the trade-off).
138. A similar problem exists in the regulation of electric utilities. In re Revision & Promulgation
of Rules for Long-Term Forecast Reports & Integrated Resource Plans of Elec. Light Cos., 1989 Ohio
PUC LEXIS 1306, at *5 (Dec. 19, 1989) (order denying rehearing).
139. Robert E. Bums & Mark Eifert, Designing Purchased Gas Adjustment Clauses to Provide for
Incentive Compatibility in a More Competitive Environment, in RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS: CONFERENCE
ON NATURAL GAS USE, STATE REGULATION AND MARKET DYNAMICS IN THE POST 636/ENERGY POLICY
ACT ERA 543 (Apr. 26-28, 1993). For a similar suggestion, see Local Distribution Company Post-





Part and parcel of this conservatism is the element of regulatory risk itself.
"Some analysts have argued that LDCs, in an environment of intense prudence
reviews, begin to purchase gas not to meet the overriding goals of reliability,
cost, and cost stability, but rather purchase gas in ways defensible in a
reasonableness review."' Taken together, the effects of the regulatory
system itself tend to be at odds with each other. It is not remarkable, therefore,
that there have been calls for a modified definition of prudence in the new
regulatory environment created by Order No. 636.141
3. Integrated Resource Planning
In response to the problems of prudence reviews and to changing
regulatory approaches in general, support has grown for prospective reviews
of utility purchasing. 141 While such planning is in its infancy for gas
utilities, 43 it has been part of electric utility regulation for several years.'
44
One estimate suggests that more than thirty states have some form of planning
process in place.' 5 Moreover, the National Energy Policy Act mandates at
least the consideration of such an approach for gas utilities by the end of
1994.'" States are beginning formal processes to address that mandate.'47
Integrated resource planning (IRP) involves utility management and state
commissions in a process of prospectively determining what mix of supply and
demand options will produce reliable service at the lowest cost. 4 Generally,
140. GOLDMAN ET AL., supra note 128, at 71.
141. Craig S. Cano, Vlnter of Our Discontent? Cautiously, Gas Industry OfficiaLs Say No, INSIDE
F.E.R.C., Nov. 22, 1993, at 11.
142. Larry Foster, Debate on LDC Restructuring Long on Questions, Short on Answers, INSIDE
F.E.R.C., May 24, 1993, at 10; NGSA Issues Checklist to Help PUCs Implement Order No. 636, FOSTER
NAT. GAS REP., Dec. 30, 1993, at 4; John Simpson & Lori Burkhart, Industry, Regulators Share Visions
for Natural Gas, FORT., June 1, 1993, at 10.
143. GOLDMAN ET AL., supra note 128, at 3.
144. Ohio, for example, has had rules for electric utility ERP in place since 1989. See In re Revision
& Promulgation of Rules for Long-Term Forecast Reports & Integrated Resource Plans of Elec. Light
Cos., 1989 Ohio PUC LEXIS 1144 (Oct. 31, 1989).
145. Leonard V. Parent, If It Isn't One Thing, It's Another, Integrated Resource Planning, Pipe
Line Progress, PIPE LINE INDUSTRY, Feb. 1993, at 13.
146. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 115, 106 Stat. 2776, 2803 (1992); see
Donald F. Santa, Jr. & Patricia J. Beneke, Federal Natural Gas Policy and the Energy Policy Act of
1992, 14 ENERGY L.J. 1, 23-24 (1993) (discussing legislative history).
147. In re Investigation into Standards Regarding the Encouragement of Inv. in Conservation &
Energy Efficiency by Gas Utils. Under Section 115 of the Energy Policy Act of 1992, 1993 Minn. PUC
LEXIS 176 (Nov. 8, 1993); Rulemaking to Consider the Comm'n's Compliance with the Energy Policy
Act of 1992, 1993 Cal. PUC LEUS 484 (June 3, 1993).
148. GOLDMAN ET AL., supra note 128, at 3 ("lRP involves a process used by utilities to assess
a comprehensive set of supply- and demand-side options based upon consistent planning assumptions
in order to create a resource mix that reliably satisfies customers' short-term and long-term energy
service needs at the lowest total cost."); NARUC Studies Integrated Resource Planning, FOSTER NAT.
GAS REP., Jan. 20, 1994, at 13 ("IRP may take either a formal regulatory path or may become a set
of processes overlaid upon existing business and regulatory practices. ") (discussing GOLDMAN, supra
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the regulatory process will require the LDC to prepare and present an
integrated resource plan that explicitly considers supply and demand options.
Public participation and either commission review or approval of the plan will
follow.t49
Like prudence reviews, integrated resource planning has strengths and
weaknesses. The primary benefits come from the expectation of better resource
planning.
An integrated resource planning process can help facilitate a
systematic approach for utility managers to evaluate diverse business
activities and potential investments . . . . Gas utilities will
increasingly have to offer innovative services to diverse customer
groups with varying needs . . . . After completing a strategic
planning process, the utility is in a much better position to explain
its decision-making and resource procurement process, whether or
not it is required to do so by a regulatory commission. 50
In addition, integrated resource planning would likely reduce the regulatory
risk of disallowance that a utility would face without the plan in hand.' The
assumption is that if the utility commission approves the supply structure of
the utility at the outset, it would be less likely to attempt to second guess a
LDC.152
These benefits, however, come with some likely costs. 53 Most
problematic is stagnation which could result from integrated resource planning.
A utility with a commission-approved least or best cost fuel
procurement plan is unlikely to deviate greatly from that plan since
any deviation places them [sic] at risk of a prudence disallowance.
Instead of taking advantage of price differentials among various fuel
note 128, from which definition in text was drawn); see also Cano, supra note 86, at 7 (comments by
Adam Jaffe).
149. GOLDMAN ET AL., supra note 128, at 25.
150. Id. at 26-28.
151. Id. at 28-29. The Ohio commission conceded as much when it adopted its rules for electric
company integrated resource planning. In re Revision & Promulgation of Rules for Long-lbrm Forecast
Reports & Integrated Resource Plans of Electric Light Cos., 1989 Ohio PUC LEXIS 1144, at *7 (Oct.
31, 1989) ("[S]ubjectivity in the retrospective analysis of the prudence of management activities will
be minimized by the development of a comprehensive record in forecast evaluation proceedings.").
In addition to better planning and decreased regulatory risk, the report prepared for the National
Association of Regulatory Commissions listed as additional benefits: (1) better penetration of end-use
options for high efficiency products, (2) public participation in resource planning, and (3) coordination
of energy and environmental planning. GOLDMAN ET AL., supra note 128, at 29-30.
152. Pierce, supra note 31, at 51.
153. See GOLDMAN ET AL., supra note 128, at 31-32 (forecasting high administrative costs versus





markets (for example, gas futures, spot gas, short-term gas, or long-
term gas), fuel managers tend to stand firm. The ex-ante fuel
procurement review tends to substitute for legitimate managerial
prerogatives as the utility adheres to the fuel portfolio approved in
the ex ante plan.' 54
A variation of this problem is the lack of flexibility that the plan may
imply.'55 Also, the gains associated with integrated resource planning will
not be significant because the practical implications of demand-side
management, such as introducing high efficiency water heaters, are not
great.'56 Finally, integrated resource planning has the potential to involve
high administrative costs.' 57 This problem would be particularly visible in
early periods of implementation as the companies, the public, and the
commissions struggle to determine the unclear definitions associated with
integrated resource planning."'
Integrated resource planning has some obvious appeal, but shares many
of the same problems as prudence reviews. On the one hand, both the
commissions and the public would obtain at least a view of the planning
process, and access would benefit the company, at least to the extent of
154. Bums & Bifert, supra note 139, at 543.
155. As Duann points out:
The main disadvantage of the prior-review approach is that the procurement plan may be
developed and agreed on far ahead of time and the gas market conditions may have
changedconsiderably. By the time the procurement plan is implemented, it is clearly a less
desirable plan. Since the LDC's gas procurement decisions will still be evaluated based upon
the agreed-upon plan, the LDC will have tittle incentive to make the necessary adjustments,
knowing it will not be penalized for not changing the procurement plan. The implied fixity
of an agreed gas procurement plan appears to be counterproductive.
Duann, supra note 28, at 78.
156. As Goldman, et al. elaborate:
Avoided electricity costs often tend to be higher than gas avoided costs when adjusted for
equivalent energy service provided. However, it is not that easy to directly compare avoided
electric and gas costs because of differences in costing methods and conventions, end-use
conversion efficiencies, and operational characteristics of electric and gas utilities. Despite
that caveat, avoided gas costs that are lower than avoided electric costs for DSM suggest
that: (1) it will be relatively more difficult for gas energy efficiency programs to pass cost-
effectiveness tests compared to electric DSM programs, and (2) all else being equal, net
DSM program benefits might be smaller.
GOLDMAN CT AL., supra note 128, at 20-21 (citations omitted); see also David Dodson, Impact of SFV
Rates, Thnsition Costs Overstated, Analysts Argue, INsIDE F.E.R.C., Nov. 29, 1993, at 11.
157. GOLDMAN ET AL., supra note 128, at 31.
158. Parent more fully describes this problem of variation between IRPs of different locations:
IRPs are supposed to take into consideration the costs to society of environmental
degradation that are not currently reflected in the price paid for energy at the burner tip or
the point-of-use. But the manner of consideration varies widely from state to state, from
commission to commission.
Parent, supm note 145, at 13. The Ohio commission conceded the difficulty of the problem in its order
adopting IRP for electric companies. In re Revision & Promulgation of Rules for Long-term Forecast
Reports & Integrated Resource Plans of Bloc. Light Cos., 1989 Ohio PUC LEXIS 1144, at *9-10 (Oct.
31, 1989) (defining least cost alternatives).
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reducing regulatory risk. On the other hand, these benefits may not translate
into any real financial gains that could not otherwise be obtained by the gas
industry through less expensive alternatives such as building codes. Indeed,
the benefits may well result in lost opportunities for cost savings through
purchasing.
A proposal by Adam Jaffe and Joseph Kalt takes the interesting alternative
approach of providing gas purchase planning." 9 The Jaffe-Kalt method is
clearly not a full process of integrated resource planning because it does not
adjust for demand-side management. Instead, it looks only at the mix of gas
options. "Pre-approval policies would require a gas... utility to justify the
composition of its acquisition portfolio before the PUC, much the same way
that IRP [Integrated Resource Planning] policies now require utilities to justify
the extent of their reliance on Demand-Side Management . . . and so
forth."' ° The process would provide a range of options with which the
utility could work with some assurance of regulatory approval. 6'
The approach has two potential advantages. First, it avoids the problem
of trying to determine avoided gas costs, a process that appears to have little
likelihood of success. Second, it provides the utility with some assurance that
its plan, if followed, will result in prudent, and therefore recoverable,
expenditures.
4. Incentive Regulation
In reaction to the limits of both pre- and post-review of costs in traditional
regulation, a growing number of scholars, regulators, and regulated entities
argue for some form of incentive regulation. The primary justification for such
a change is the information asymmetry that exists between utilities and state
commissions. Without a clear sense of how various costs of service fit
together, commissions arguably will fail to provide the right cost signals to
utilities and their customers.6 12  As a counterbalance to information
asymmetries, regulators can attempt to insert incentives in elements of the
traditional rate structure or totally divorce prices from costs.
159. Adam B. Jaffe & Joseph P. Kalt, Oversight of Regulated Utilities' Fuel Supply Contracts:
Achieving Maximum Benefit from Competitive Natural Gas and Ermission Allowance Markets, in RECORD
OF PROCEEDINGS: CONFERENCE ON NATURAL GAS USE, STATE REGULATION AND MARKET DYNAMICS
IN THE POST 636/ENERGY POLICY ACT ERA 121, 123 (Apr. 26-28, 1993) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Jaffe & Kalt, Oversight of Regulated Utilities]; see also Adam R Jaffe & Joseph P. Kalt,
Insight on Oversight, FORT., Apr. 15, 1994, at 23, 24-25.
160. Jaffe & Kalt, Oversight of Regulated Utilities, supra note 159, at 123.
161. Id. Another interesting aspect of the Jaffe-Kalt approach is the use of competitive bidding to
fill gas contracts. Id. at 123-24.
162. Duann, supra note 28 at 80; Mohammad Harunuzzaman et al., Incentive Regulation for Local






Two common ways of providing incentives involve allowing the utility
to retain cost savings or to add additional returns for desired behavior. For
example, the commission might set a target rate for gas expenses. If the utility
beats that goal, it keeps or shares the benefits of the lower cost. If the utility
misses the goal, it absorbs or shares the loss." 3 In this way, the utility's
management has an incentive that is consistent with the customers' welfare
interest.
One difficulty with such an approach arises in the setting of target
prices.'" One logical construct would use the spot price of gas. Since the
spot price represents the current market-clearing price of gas, it is, arguably,
the proper measure of value that the utility should be seeking to attain. 6 '
Regulators, however, are likely to balk at setting prices based on contracts that
require only best-efforts production with thirty-day limits. 66 Moreover, price
is more volatile than it would be under longer-term agreements.167 While
these short term contracts may be an economic solution, they may not provide
the political cover regulators desire.
Another problem with basing incentives on expenses is that it creates
problems in calculating the allowable rate of return for the regulated portion
of the utility. In the basic formula, rate of return is tied to the rate base, not
expenses, and the utility is allowed only a rate of return on rate base. The
effect of an incentive structure tied to expenses is that it leverages the rate of
return. The extent of the leverage would depend on the ratio of expenses to
allowed rate of return and the accuracy of the expense predictions used to set
163. For an application of this approach, see Harunuzzaman et al., supra note 162, at 54-65 and
Bums & Eifert, supra note 139, at 543-45. A detailed discussion of the target-rule proposal is contained
in Robert B. Burns et al., Current PGA and FAC Practices: Implications for Rate making in Competitive
Markets, 91-13 NAT'L REa. RFS. INST. 175-221 (1991).
164. Duann, supra note 28, at 82.
165. For an interesting discussion of this point, see Hatcher & Tbssing, supra note 23, at 21-32.
Like Bums and Eifert, they propose a benefit-splitting approach, but their base is tied to a weighted
average of spot-market prices. Id. at 29.
166. A fine explanation of why regulators will likely hesitate to use only best-efforts production
with thirty day limits is explained by Haninuzzaman et al.:
It may not be economically optimal to minimize either long-term contract costs or spot-
purchase costs individually. This is because the optimal mix depends on demand parameters
such as peak demand and annual volume demand, and supply parameters such as the
maximum delivery per day each firm supplier can guarantee and the total volume each spot
supplier is able to deliver.
Harunuzzaman et al., supra note 162, at 55. There would appear to be less legal protection against
breach as well. Richelle, supra note 31, at 666, 676. Hatcher and Tussing, however, point out that spot
markets have been more successful in recent years in covering for firm contract shortfall during periods
of peak demand. Hatcher & Tussing, supra note 23, at 27 n.21.
167. In a discussion of the spot market, Richelle notes that reported spot-market prices moved from
$.95/Mcf to $2.65/Mcf between February and September 1992. Richelle, supra note 31, at 662-63. The
days of the twenty year contract and its accompanying inefficiencies, however, appear to be gone.
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the gas component of retail rate to customers. In any case, rate of return could
be greatly exaggerated or injured by the use of an incentive built into
expenses. 16
In theory, this leverage problem could be solved by allocating the amount
of the savings or loss between the company and its customers. For example,
the company and its customers might share equally any loss or gain around
the target price for gas.'69 This theory, however, is extraordinarily difficult
to apply in practice. Setting the appropriate sharing ratio is hardly a science.
Rather, it will reflect a political judgment about the particular level of risk each
of the relevant parties should absorb in the newly defined market for natural
gas.17
0
As a second alternative, the commission might vary the rate of return
based on performance.' 7' For example, some states have tied the basis points
for return on equity to the performance levels of power plants.172 The clear
advantage is the mechanism's simplicity. Once the standards are set, the
commission and utility can mechanically calculate the allowable return."
It is not clear, however, that there is any marginal advantage to adopting such
a scheme over even simpler options available to the commission.
[I]t can be argued that under flexible rate-of-return pricing the cost-
control incentive will not be that much different from the incentive
effects of regulatory lag under the traditional rate-of-return
regulation. This approach also has apparently no direct effect in
adding flexibility for pricing core-distribution service. It is a
somewhat compromising approach which may be viewed as a trans-
168. Walker explains:
Disallowances of gas costs can easily wipe out an LDC's earnings. A review of 1992 fiscal results
for the 53-company C.A. a bner Distribution and Integrated Natural Gas Group demonstrates this
point. Sixty percent of the group's revenues were gas costs ($16.6 billion), while income available
for common equity was $1.5 billion. A 9-percent disallowance of gas costs would nearly erase
the group's earnings. Conversely, if allowed to keep or share an equal percentage, its earnings
would increase dramatically.
Harold Walker III, Managing Gas Supply Risk, FORT., Mar. 1, 1994, at 39.
169. For an example of the approach using a sharing mechanism, see Harunuzzaman et al., supra
note 162, at 63-64.
170. Id. It is also important to note that expense-based incentive programs have been attacked
because they have been of limited success. PHILLIPS, supra note 2, at 564 n.156 (citing Eric .
Schneidewind & Bruce A. Campbell, Michigan Incentive Regulanion: The Next Step, in CHALLENGES
FOR PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION IN THE 1980s 407 (Harry M. Trebing ed., 1981)).
171. See generally Harunuzzaman et al., supra note 162, at 77-79.
172. PHILLIPS, supra note 2, at 535-36.
173. Duann, supra note 28, at 84-85.
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ition from the current cost-based regulation to a more "direct"
incentive regulation. 74
In short, it may be tinkering without any real purpose.
b. Price Caps
In response to the problems associated with incremental changes, a more
radical demand for price caps sometimes emerges. This form of incentive
regulation seeks to separate pricing from costs by setting a ceiling price and
allowing the utility to retain or share the earned profits. 7 '
Under pure [price cap regulation], the earnings of a regulated
company are divorced entirely from both its realized production costs
and its investment decisions. Maximum average price levels (price
caps) are specified in advance and remain unaltered as the magnitude
of the company's realized production costs change or its investment
patterns and performance vary. In this respect, the company bears
the full financial implications of its actions. 76
After a rate hearing of some sort, the incentive rates permitted for particular
services would permit the company to recover its costs as initially established.
In subsequent periods, the approach would permit increases in rates for
exogenous factors such as inflation and taxes. Yet it would encourage the
utility to reduce costs by accounting for and offsetting costs against expected
increases in productivity. 17
7
There may be several benefits from this form of regulation. First, because
every dollar saved is profit for the utility, it creates incentives for utilities to
cut costs. 78 This incentive would be consistent with the effects of Order No.
636's requirement of access to competitive gas markets. Second, it avoids
174. Id. at 85.
175. Harunuzzaman et al., supra note 162, at 46-47.
176. David E.M. Sappington & Dennis L. Weisman, Designing Superior Incentive Regulation:
Accounting for All of the Incentives All of the Thme, FORT., Feb. 15, 1994, at 13.
177. For examples of price caps in telecommunications, see Policy & Rules Concerning Rates for
Dominant Carriers, 54 Fed. Reg. 19,836 (1989); In re Alternative Regulatory Frameworks for Local
Exchange Carriers, 107 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) I (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1989). For a mom
complete description of the federal scheme, see Frank P. Dar, Deregulation of Tlephone Serkces in
Ohio, 24 AKRON L. REv. 229, 258-61 (1990); Sutapa Ghosh, The Piture of FCC Dominant Carier
Regulation: The Price Caps Scheme, 41 FED. CoMM. L.J. 401 (1989). Caps have also been used by
other national authorities outside the United States. Alexander L Black, Responsible Regulation: Incentive
Raes for Natural Gas Pipelines, 28 TULSA L.J. 349, 375 (1993) (describing Great Britain's regulation
of British Tblecom).
178. Duann, supra note 28, at 83-84; Hyde M. Merrill, Interutility Electricity Pricing: Theory vs.
How to Do It, FORT., Jan. 15, 1994, at 19-20.
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exposing customers to monopoly rates. The cap prevents that form of
expropriation.179 Finally, administrative costs could be reduced.8 °
Each of these strengths, however, has an elemental problem. First, it is
not clear that the incentives would have the intended effects on behavior.
Because any really successful program will result in additional state scrutiny
to adjust rates to a proper level that does not result in too much return, there
is a counter-incentive to take small steps."" Second, a successful program
may encourage a diminution in the quality of service as the company cuts costs
to improve its return under price caps.' In the newly deregulated gas
market, this change might translate into either inefficient long-term contracts
or uncertain short-term arrangements. Third, even though the second argument
in favor of caps-that caps avoid gouging-is premised on the belief that the
state commission can properly set the rates, the escalators, and the offset,
"[tihere are complex problems to be resolved in the implementation of any
price-cap regulation. These problems include the selection of the initial price
cap, the adjustment indices, the types of services covered, and the period for
reconciliation. "'1 These problems are especially apparent during periods of
price instability.'" The process of setting and monitoring these sorts of rates
is just as complicated as a full-blown rate case,' and the public relations
problems for a commission that permits a rate that turns out to be too high may
be even worse. "6 Thus, while price caps may seem to get the incentives
right at one level, the counter-incentives and administrative problems present
significant reasons to reject that approach.
III. Dealing with the Future: A Combination Approach
The foregoing discussion of the various ways a commission might pursue
the goals of low-cost and efficient administration indicates that no single
regulatory or market scheme is a panacea. Rather, each alternative has benefits
and costs. The real solution lies in finding the balance of tools and markets
179. The company's initial rates will be set to recover its existing costs, including reasonable
expenses. However, the plans would require periodic true-ups to insure that the program would continue
to work in subsequent periods.
180. Harunazzunman, supra note 162, at 66 ("One perception is that price caps would spread out
the number of rate reviews over time, with the different stakeholders expending less resources as a
consequence.").
181. See Sappington & Weisman, supra note 176, at 14-15 (discussing the problem of recontracting
by state commissions).
182. Merrill, supra note 178, at 21.
183. Duann, supra note 28, at 83.
184. Harunuzzaman et al., supra note 162, at 91.
185. Merrill, supra note 178, at 21.
186. Id. at 84. A related concern is that regulators will reject the approach as being inconsistent




that best accomplishes those goals at a particular time when the rules are
changing and utilities, commissions, and customers are apprehensive.
A. Some Reasonable Assumptions
The proposal that follows is premised on the general goals of utility
regulation: avoidance of monopoly pricing; sensitivity to distributional issues;
and recognition of administrative costs."8 7 Additionally, the proposal rests
on several assumptions.
First, reliance on a single regulatory tool or the market is not a workable
solution. The various tools, ex ante or post hoc reviews or particular types of
incentive regulation, all have inherent problems that make each one standing
alone insufficient. In addition, markets are inappropriate remedies because the
large core residential customer base is bound to the LDC in what currently
appears to be a natural-monopoly relationship. The solution, then, may lie in
some combination that draws on providing market-like incentives within the
framework of limited regulation.
Second, administrative costs will not be determinative, although the costs
may lead to limitations at the margins. Commissions can be expected to
continue regulating for the reasons suggested previously.' They will
continue to use a set of tools, and those tools are costly. Indeed, there is every
reason to believe that initially commissions will feel a need to exert more effort
just to fill the informational void created by the new rules set out in Order No.
636. While administrative cost at the margins will be important, and the
commissions should attempt to adopt a cost-effective mix of tools, deregulation
at the federal level will not translate into reduced administrative costs at the
state level. In the short term, the opposite is likely to be the case.
Third, commissions will require companies to adopt some sort of mix of
long-term, short-term, and spot purchases to satisfy core customer
requirements. Although there are arguments to the contrary (and the California
commission is experimenting with other alternatives based on spot prices), 8 9
it seems unlikely that commissions ex ante will find it acceptable for a gas
utility to guarantee service on thirty-day spot-market contracts.
Fourth, utility commission will seek to balance monopoly pricing concerns
against loss of high-load customers to minimize underuse of facilities (stranded
costs) through wider use of transportation programs. Commissions will attempt
to keep high-load customers in the system in order to spread demand-related
costs. The trade-off for gas utilities is that these high-load customers may be
required to absorb more than the incremental price of transportation. That is,
187. See supra Part HI.C.l.
188. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 113.
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these customers will pay transportation rates that will include costs that might
be identified as demand costs that are usually only assignable to firm
transportation and commodity customers.
Finally, there are some transaction costs in leaving the LDC and
contracting for gas supplies and transportation. These costs include one-time
payments required to make a new connection, and the ongoing costs of
contracting for gas supplies and transportation. These costs create some
cushion in setting transportation rates.
B. A Transitional Approach to Gas Acquisition Reviews
Based on the assumptions set out above, regulation should consist of ex
ante planning, incentive rate setting, and post hoc reconciliation."' 0 Although
administrative costs are potentially high, this approach would tend to lower
the uncertainty of review and encourage entry into new markets.
In practice, a commission would establish guidelines to determine the
acceptable range of risk represented by varying mixes of spot, short-term, and
long-term gas contracts. The commission would then set a target range or dead
band of costs for gas. Within that dead band, the commission would estimate
gas cost, and set that as the cost of gas to be recovered in rates. The utility
could fill its gas needs in the market through whatever means it chooses.
Periodically, annually or semi-annually, the commission would review the
rates to determine if the range has been properly set, if the company is making
prudent purchasing decisions, and if the company is continuing to earn a
reasonable rate of return. During this review, the gas costs would be reviewed
to determine compliance with the resource plan. If the utility is within the dead
band, there would be no adjustment. If its gas costs are below projected levels,
and the company did not unreasonably subject the core customers to
unnecessary price risks, it would retain all or a part of the customer receipts,
subject to any sharing mechanism the commission might establish. If the
utility's gas costs are above the projected levels, and the company did not
purchase gas at unreasonably high rates, it would recover none or a portion
of the underpayment from customers, subject to any sharing mechanism the
commission might establish.
Because there is a potential for major swings in recovery, the commission
would also need to review the rate of return to determine if the company was
continuing to earn a reasonable return on rate base. To the extent that the
company was over-earning or under-earning, there might be a need to adjust
190. What follows draws heavily on the literature concerning incentive regulation of gas
utilities, in particular the work of Bums & Bifert, Harunuzzaman et al., and Jaffe & Kalt. See
supra notes Part U.C.2-C.4.a. The attempt here is to draw the strengths of the various approaches
together while elimnating as many of the weaknesses as possible.
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the formulas used to set gas expenses, to review the distribution between
customers and the utility of benefits and losses due to purchasing, or to
consider initiating a full review of rates.
For example, assume that a utility needs 200,000 units of gas for
customers. It might fill that need through various combinations of contracts.
Further assume that through a gas purchase planning hearing, the commission
determines that the appropriate range of contracts is between a combination
of 30% spot, 30% short-term, and 40% long-term (30-30-40), and a
combination of 20% spot, 30% short-term, and 50% long-term (20-30-50). If
average prices for these types of contracts at the time of the finding are $1.90,
$2.00, and $3.00, then the dead band of rates would be $2.37 to $2.48.19,
Assume the commission sets the price for billing at the midpoint of the range.
If the utility's gas costs are within the dead band, there is no disallowance of
or additional recovery. If the gas costs are lower than $2.37, the utility would
either retain or partially retain receipts based on the average price. In that
case, however, the commission would determine whether the company incurred
an unreasonable amount of risk. If the gas utility did not incur unreasonable
risks, the commission should allow the pass through of receipts to the utility
to continue. For the next period, however, the commission might want to
consider making an adjustment to the formula for calculating the dead
band. 9 2 If the gas cost savings are attributable to a different mix of
contracts, the commission should consider revising the formula to reflect more
191. The calculations are set out below:
Spot Short Long Total Cost Ave.
(%) (%) (%) Cost
(ToO (To) (Tot) TC
(SP) (ShP) (LP) Tot
High $114,000 $120,000 $240,000 $474,000 $2.37
Risk (.3) (.3) (.4)
(200,000) (200,000) (200,000)($1.90) ($2.00) ($3.00)
Low $76,000 $120,000 $300,000 $496,000 $2.48
Risk (.2) (.3) (.5)(200,000) (200,000) (200,000)
(1.90) ($2.00) ($3.00)
The figure in each block indicates the percentage of that particular component assigned by the
commission. lb calculate properly the weighted average of the total, the component totals am calculated,
summed (TC), and divided by the total number of units.
192. Under this circumstance, the recalculation should only occur if there were an expectation of
continued low rates.
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clearly the market risks that appear reasonable under changing circumstances.
If the utility acted unreasonably in incurring the savings, then the response
should be a full or total refund of the savings to customers. 93
If the gas costs exceed those projected by the dead band, the utility would
be liable for all or part of the excess costs. If the utility was reasonable in
incurring these costs, then the predetermined recovery mechanism should be
applied. As in the prior example, the commission should determine whether
the preexisting price assumptions and mix ratios should be adjusted. If the
commission determines that the overage is the result of imprudent behavior,
however, then the loss should fall on the utility.
This proposal meets the criteria for setting the incentives in a manner that
is consistent for both sides of the transaction. The utility has an opportunity
to take advantage of the marketplace and retain some of the benefits of its
managerial efforts. The commission will not have to bailout the utility for its
mistakes or foreclose the possibility that existing practices cannot be improved
and then passed through to customers. The proposal will encourage least-cost
purchasing and simultaneously assure the commission that the utility is not
taking advantage of the risk presented by some forms of incentive regulation.
It is unclear, however, whether this incentive form of regulation has the
ability to avoid the problems and disincentives associated with a commission's
reversal. Part of the problem may be avoided by adding a requirement that the
utility competitively bid its requirements under the formula.' 4 Bidding might
have the effect of assuring regulators that the gas purchases made were the best
available for a given level of reliability. Thus, the regulators would have less
incentive to reverse or recontract prior determinations. Formal auctions,
however, carry their own costs, and it is not clear that the costs are
justified.'95 If the incentives cannot be built into the process by some sort
of external factor, then it will fall on the state commission to regulate in good
faith and avoid the recontracting problems on its own initiative.
A second problem is that commission review will require substantial
administrative resources. To create confidence in the end product, the
commission will be reviewing a broader range of purchasing activities. Despite
increased administrative costs and resources, the apparent trend in regulation
points in this direction. The alternatives to setting core customer
rates-increased prudence reviews, price caps, or deregulation-are not
193. 7b the extent that the utility stayed within the ranges and took advantage of lower prices, those
lower prices should be reflected in the new calculation of the dead band. This aspect of the proposal
is problematic since it creates an incentive for the commission to disallow costs. Commissions have often
been attacked for their abuse of this power. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Public Utility Regulatory Takings:
Should the Judiciary Attempt to Police the Political Institutions?, 77 GEO. L.J. 2031, 2047-53 (1989).
194. Jaffe & Kalt, Oversight of Regulated Utilities, supra note 160, at 123-24 (proposing mandating
LDCs to seek competitive bids for gas resources).
195. Electronic bulletin board systems may be one way to reduce auction costs.
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particularly palatable. Moreover, to the extent that the proposed formula
works, the review process would be simplified over time as the informational
problems decrease with experience. More importantly, the proposal looks at
gas costs, the most significant and variable item in the customer bill.196 It
logically follows that the commission should focus its resources on assuring
itself and the public that the utility is making reasonable efforts to address the
new marketplace and take advantage of available benefits.
C. The Problem of Bypass
The commission will face both renewed claims of bypass and the need
to address transportation access and rates. Some level of unbundling would
appear to be a foregone conclusion. The marketplace requires a response that
includes transportation. 197 Most states already permit such inclusion and
Order No. 636 will further encourage such actions on the part of customers
that have the means to purchase gas. The real debate will be on setting
transportation rates that will allow LDCs to retain some of the load. That
debate will turn on whether the transportation rate should include a portion of
the system's fixed costs for what would appear to be interruptible service. As
more costs are included, the transportation rate will tend to encourage bypass;
as rates are lowered, the utility will face an ever tighter cost squeeze that will
have to be made up somewhere else.' 98
Although it is clear that price discrimination cannot be sustained,19 9 it
is not self-evident that all fuel-switching customers will leave the system in
significant numbers2' or that the core customers absorb all of the costs of
bypass.2"' One element that is seldom included in the calculation, however,
is the transaction costs that a transporter must incur to leave the system.20 2
First, there is the cost of leaving the system and making any necessary new
connections to a pipeline. Second, and more important, are the costs of
contracting for a predictable level of service. The transporter either will have
to develop that expertise internally or contract for it. Recognition of this cost
may give commissions some room to shift costs in the short term to those high-
196. Harunuzzaman et al., supra note 162, at 55.
197. Broadman & Kalt, supra note 26, at 201.
198. MacAvoy et al., supra note 27, at 227, 236.
199. John R. Meyer & William B. lye, Toward Achieving brkable Competition in Industries
Undergoing a ransition to Deregulation: A Contractual Equilibrium Approach, 5 YALE J. ON
REG. 273, 286 & n.46 (1988).
200. See Over Half of Northwest Natural Gas' Thansporters Return to Sales Service, INDUS. ENERGY
BULL., Feb. 3, 1994, at 3 (Northwest Natural Gas, an LDC, reported that many customers are returning
to the LDC because of difficulties associated with contracting gas supplies and transportation.).
201. Broadman & Kalt, supra note 26, at 203.
202. Pierce, supra note 107, at 409-11.
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load customers who do not perceive that they benefit marginally from open
transportation. Again, however, this shift is probably only temporary.
Conclusion
As long as there is a core customer base that has only one provider for
its gas service, there will not be an ideal solution to the regulation of natural
gas distribution. The last segment of distribution will remain essentially
monopolistic and price regulation of some sort will continue. The problem for
regulators and utilities, however, is that some other portions of the market are
competitive. Thus, the utility faces real challenges to its ability to earn a return
on existing assets, and utility commissions lose the ability to stratify the market
and shift costs to protect residential and other high-priority customers who
cannot move to alternative services. Both planning and incentives offer some
relief. Planning involves the commissions in the choices utilities will make.
For the utilities, planning offers some protection from regulatory second-
guessing. Incentive regulation, within certain parameters, offers all parties
some of the benefits and risks of the newly restructured markets.
The proposed solution is imperfect and transitional. Imperfect solutions,
however, will be common in an industry in which "gas is a commodity, but
gas service is not."' Some regulation will be necessary in the transition
period, and state commissions should make the best possible attempt to assure
that an effective regime is in place.
203. Id. at 407.
104
Vol. 12:69, 1995


